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INTRODUCTION 
At its inauguration in October 2012, the European Stability 
Mechanism (“ESM”) was hailed by European political leaders 
and top EU officials as a historic milestone in shaping the future 
of the ailing Economic and Monetary Union (“EMU”). Set forth 
in the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism 
(“ESM Treaty” or “TESM”),1 the ESM was introduced to provide 
stability support to euro area Member States experiencing severe 
financing problems as a result of the ongoing sovereign debt 
crisis. Apparently, those leaders and officials did not expect that 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU” or “the 
Court”), which still had to rule on the compatibility of the ESM 
Treaty with the Union Treaties,2 would spoil their party. They 
were right. The Pringle judgment,3 which followed less than two 
months later, gave the ESM Treaty the final stamp of approval 
and paved the way for new financial assistance programs. 
The judgment is significant for several reasons. First and 
foremost, the Court’s interpretation of the ‘no-bailout’ clause,4 a 
key provision underpinning the EMU, has the practical effect of 
authorizing future financial assistance by the ESM as well as 
previously agreed programs currently in place under various 
temporary financial assistance mechanisms.5 The Court 
answered the fundamental question of whether Member States 
are allowed under the Union Treaties to provide stability 
support to each other. Also of practical relevance, it ruled that 
the Union’s institutions—more specifically the European 
Commission, the European Central Bank (“ECB”), and the 
                                                                                                                                     
1. Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, Feb. 2, 2012, 
[hereinafter TESM], available at http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/
582311/05-tesm2.en12.pdf. 
2. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2012 O.J. C 326/13 
[hereinafter TEU]; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, 2012 O.J. C 326/47 [hereinafter TFEU]. In this Article, these two 
foundational treaties are referred to as the “Union Treaties.” 
3. Thomas Pringle v. Gov’t of Ireland, Case C-370/12, [2012] E.C.R. I____ 
(delivered Nov. 27, 2012). 
4. See TFEU, supra note 2, art. 125(1), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 99. 
5. On this later point, see Vestert Borger, The ESM and the European Court’s 
Predicament in Pringle, 14 GERMAN L.J. 113, 132 (2013). 
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Court itself—could be ‘borrowed’ by the euro area Member 
States within the context of the ESM. 
The judgment also has constitutional significance. 
Monetary policy for the euro area Member States is an exclusive 
competence of the Union.6 Where the Union Treaties confer on 
the Union such competence, only the Union may legislate and 
adopt legally binding acts. The Member States are only allowed 
to do so themselves if they are empowered by the Union or for 
the implementation of Union acts.7 Yet, over the course of the 
sovereign debt crisis, the Member States on several occasions 
resorted to the adoption of legally binding acts, namely 
international agreements, which have as their object the 
enhancement or further development of the EMU. While the 
Member States are required to coordinate their economic 
policies within the Union,8 the Union Treaties leave them much 
room to maneuver with regard to economic policy. However, it 
is debatable whether Member States can still act through 
‘ordinary’ international agreements in an area over which they 
have transferred exclusive powers to the Union (i.e., the 
Economic and Monetary Union). In order to avoid answering 
this question, the Court had to draw a hard line between 
monetary policy and economic policy. This raises questions as to 
what extent the highly centralized Monetary Union and the 
hitherto underdeveloped Economic Union are interrelated. In 
light of the Pringle judgment it is perhaps more appropriate to 
think of the EMU as an ‘Economic and/or Monetary Union.’ 
The judgment, furthermore, marks the first time the Court 
was called upon to rule on the use of the simplified revision 
procedure under article 48(6) of the Consolidated Version of 
the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”), as introduced by the 
Lisbon Treaty. The euro area Member States opted to establish 
the ESM outside the framework of the Union Treaties. To 
facilitate this move and take away doubts as to the compatibility 
of the new stability mechanism with the ‘no-bailout’ clause, the 
European Council agreed to add the following paragraph to 
article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (“TFEU”): 
                                                                                                                                     
6. TFEU, supra note 2, art. 3(1)(c), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 51. 
7. Id. art. 2(1), at 50. 
8. Id. arts. 2(3), 5(1), at 50, 52. 
114 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:111 
3. The Member States whose currency is the euro may 
establish a stability mechanism to be activated if 
indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a 
whole. The granting of any required financial assistance 
under the mechanism will be made subject to strict 
conditionality.9 
This amendment had to be approved by all twenty-seven EU 
Member States before it could enter into force, simultaneously 
with the ESM Treaty, on January 1, 2013. However, in reaction 
to increased market tensions,10 euro area leaders later resolved 
to have the ESM Treaty enter into force by mid-2012. In Pringle, 
the Court was asked whether the decision amending article 136 
TFEU was valid and, if so, whether the ESM could actually be 
established before the entry into force of that decision. 
Section I of this Article will set out the factual and 
procedural background of the case, which originated from a 
request for a preliminary ruling by the Irish Supreme Court. 
Section II will scrutinize the judgment with regard to the three 
preliminary questions referred. It will contain an initial analysis 
and provide context. Further commentary on specific elements 
of the case can be found in Section III.  
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURE 
On August 3, 2012, the Irish Supreme Court made a 
reference for a preliminary ruling in proceedings brought by 
Thomas Pringle, T.D., a member of the Irish Parliament.11 
Mr. Pringle sought a declaration that the insertion of article 
136(3) TFEU constitutes an unlawful amendment of the TFEU, 
and also sought an injunction preventing Ireland from ratifying, 
approving, or accepting the ESM Treaty. The reference 
concerned the validity of the decision amending article 136 
TFEU and the interpretation of various provisions of the Union 
Treaties. A preliminary ruling was necessary for the Supreme 
                                                                                                                                     
9. European Council Decision No. 2011/199/EU (Amending Art. 136 TFEU), 2011 
O.J. L 91/1. 
10. See Statement by the Euro Area Heads of State or Government, Brussels 
European Council—9 December 2011, EUR. COUNCIL, 67 (Jan. 2012), available at 
http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/555285/qcao11001enc.pdf. 
11. For the application, see 2012 O.J. C 303/18. The preliminary reference 
procedure is laid down in article 267 TFEU, supra note 2, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 164. 
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Court to assess whether Ireland would breach its obligations 
under EU law by adopting and ratifying the ESM Treaty. 
Considering the matter to be one of exceptional urgency, the 
Supreme Court requested the CJEU to apply an accelerated 
procedure.12 It offered that the timely ratification of the ESM 
Treaty by Ireland was of the utmost importance to the other 
Contracting Parties, especially those in need of financial 
assistance.13 In reality, the other Contracting Parties could have 
easily proceeded without Ireland,14 although that would have 
undermined the credibility of the new stability mechanism. It 
did not come that far, however, as the Supreme Court declined 
to grant an injunction restraining Ireland from ratifying the 
ESM Treaty. Thereby it also effectively ruled out the possibility 
of an Irish referendum on the matter.15 
All Contracting Parties subsequently ratified the ESM 
Treaty. A major hurdle in this respect was overcome when the 
German Federal Constitutional Court (“GFCC”) ruled that 
Germany, the largest contributor to the ESM’s capital stock, 
could proceed with the ratification. Shortly thereafter, on 
September 27, 2012, the ESM Treaty entered into force. 
Nonetheless, by order of the President of the CJEU of October 
4, 2012, the request of the Irish Supreme Court was granted so 
as to remove as soon as possible any uncertainty as to the validity 
of the ESM Treaty, “which adversely affects the objective of the 
                                                                                                                                     
12.  See Protocol (No. 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union art. 23a, 2012 O.J. C 326/210, at 216. In the judgment, the Court referred to 
article 105(1)—formerly article 104a—of the Rules of Procedure of September 25, 
2012, 2012 O.J. C 337/1, which entered into force on November 1, 2012. 
13. Order of the President of the Court, Case C-370/12, ¶¶ 1–5 (Oct. 4, 2012). 
14. Article 48 of the TESM, supra note 1, stipulates that the ESM Treaty enters 
into force upon ratification by Contracting Parties representing 90% of the total 
subscriptions to the ESM’s authorized capital stock. Since Ireland’s contribution 
amounts to less than 1.6% thereof, the Supreme Court may have been overly generous 
in its assessment of this particular Member State’s influence on European affairs. In 
fact, only Germany, Spain, France, and Italy retained their power to ‘veto’ the ESM 
Treaty. 
15. The applicant had argued that the participation by the Irish Government in 
the adoption and ratification of the ESM Treaty was contrary to the Constitution of 
Ireland and called for a referendum on the issue. As may be remembered, Ireland has 
a history of difficult referendums on major European Treaties which impact its 
Constitution. See, e.g., JEAN-CLAUDE PIRIS, THE LISBON TREATY: A LEGAL AND POLITICAL 
ANALYSIS 49, 51 & n.81 (2010). For the judgment, see Thomas Pringle v. Ireland, 
[2012] IESC 47, Record No. 339/2012 (Ir.). 
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ESM Treaty, namely to maintain the financial stability of the 
euro area.”16 On October 23, 2012, therefore, a host of Member 
States and three EU institutions, displaying a seldom-seen unity, 
lined up in Luxembourg to defend the newly established crisis 
resolution mechanism. This demonstrates that they deemed the 
ESM of crucial importance not just for the euro area, but for the 
Union as a whole. 
The ESM is an international financial institution with full 
legal personality, established by the euro area Member States 
under public international law.17 It assumes the tasks previously 
fulfilled by the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism 
(“EFSM”) and the European Financial Stability Facility 
(“EFSF”), two temporary financial assistance mechanisms 
devised in May 2010 as part of a “comprehensive package of 
measures to preserve financial stability in Europe.”18 These 
mechanisms go hand in hand with recent efforts to reinforce 
economic governance within the euro area. In fact, the granting 
of financial assistance under the ESM has been made 
conditional on the ratification of the so-called Fiscal Compact 
Treaty19 by the ESM Member concerned.20 Since critics of 
previous euro rescue measures21 had questioned their 
compatibility with the ‘no-bailout’ clause, the Member States 
                                                                                                                                     
16. Order of the President of the Court, supra note 13, ¶¶ 6–7. 
17. TESM, supra note 1, arts. 1(1) 32(2)  
18. Press Release 9596/10 (Presse 108), Council of the European Union, 
Extraordinary Council Meeting (May 9, 2010). The European Financial Stability 
Mechanism (“EFSM”) was established by a Regulation based on article 122(2) TFEU, 
supra note 2, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 98. It allows the European Commission to contract on 
behalf of the Union borrowings on the capital markets or with financial institutions up 
to EU€60 billion under an EU budget guarantee. See Council Regulation No. 
407/2010/EU on Establishing a European Financial Stabilization Mechanism, 2010 
O.J. L 118/1 [hereinafter EFSM Regulation]. The European Financial Stability Facility 
(“EFSF”) covers the remaining EU€440 billion of the agreed package. The facility takes 
the form of a special purpose vehicle. It was established as a public limited liability 
company governed by Luxembourgish private law, owned by the euro area Member 
States. See European Financial Stability Facility, Société Anonyme, Journal Officiel du 
Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, June 8, 2010, Memorial C–No. 1189, at 57026. 
19. Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and 
Monetary Union, March 2, 2012 [hereinafter Fiscal Compact Treaty], available at 
http://www.eurozone.europa.eu/media/304649/st00tscg26_en12.pdf. 
20. See Preamble to TESM, supra note 1. 
21. See, e.g., Lothar Knopp, Griechenland—Nothilfe auf dem Verfassungsrechtlichen 
Prüfstand, 63 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1777 (2010); Matthias Ruffert, The 
European Debt Crisis and European Union Law, 48 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1777 (2011). 
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agreed that a permanent ‘bailout fund’ (as the envisaged ESM 
was labeled by non-believers) would need a more solid 
grounding in the Union Treaties to withstand future challenges 
before the courts. However, their decision to amend article 136 
TFEU via a new simplified revision procedure, less than a year 
after the troubled entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, only 
added fuel to the fire. 
The Irish Supreme Court referred three questions to the 
CJEU.22 It sought to ascertain, firstly, whether European Council 
Decision 2011/199 is valid insofar as it amends article 136 TFEU 
by providing for the insertion, on the basis of the simplified 
revision procedure under article 48(6) TEU, of a third 
paragraph relating to the establishment of the ESM. Secondly, 
the Supreme Court sought to ascertain whether articles 2, 3, 
4(3), and 13 TEU, and articles 2(3), 3(1)(c), 3(2), 119 to 123, 
and 125 to 127 TFEU, and the general principles of effective 
judicial protection and legal certainty, preclude a euro area 
Member State from concluding and ratifying an agreement such 
as the ESM Treaty. Thirdly, it asked whether said Member States 
may conclude and ratify the ESM Treaty before the entry into 
force of the aforementioned European Council Decision. 
Mr. Pringle argued before the CJEU that participation by 
euro area Member States in the ESM Treaty is incompatible with 
their obligations under article 125 TFEU. He stated that the 
European Council had correctly assessed that an amendment of 
the Union Treaties would be necessary to permit a permanent 
stability mechanism, but submitted that the rule of law requires 
that the amendment take effect before said mechanism is 
established. Mr. Pringle further disputed the chosen procedure 
for the amendment; fundamental changes to the EU legal 
order, he argued, cannot be adopted using a simplified revision 
procedure. 
                                                                                                                                     
22. Given that the highest courts of the Member States are under an obligation to 
refer questions on the interpretation of the Union Treaties and the validity and 
interpretation of acts of the Union’s institutions to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (“CJEU”), the German Federal Constitutional Court should have already 
brought the matter before the Court. 
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II. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 
Little over a month after the hearing, sitting as a full Court 
of twenty-seven judges for the first time in a preliminary 
reference procedure, the CJEU confirmed the validity of the 
decision amending article 136 TFEU and the compatibility of 
the ESM Treaty with EU law. In this section, the three 
preliminary questions will be discussed in their original order. 
A. Question 1: The Validity of the Decision Amending Article 136 
TFEU 
The European Council, the Commission, and several 
intervening Member States contested the jurisdiction of the 
CJEU to examine the first preliminary question concerning the 
validity of the decision amending article 136 TFEU. They 
contended that the Court has no power under article 267 TFEU 
to assess the validity of provisions of primary EU law.23 However, 
as the Court argued, while it is true that the decision concerns 
the insertion of a new provision of primary law, the question of 
validity concerns an act of one of the Union’s institutions, 
namely the European Council. Therefore, whenever the 
European Council uses the simplified revision procedure under 
article 48(6) TEU, it falls to the Court to verify firstly that the 
procedural rules laid down in article 48(6) TEU were followed, 
and, secondly, subject to the third paragraph thereof, that the 
amendments decided upon concern only Part Three of the 
TFEU.24 
The Court first examined whether the amendment 
envisaged by the decision concerns solely provisions of Part 
Three of the TFEU on the Union’s policies and internal actions. 
This may seem like an easy puzzle to solve. After all, article 136 
TFEU is to be found in Part Three of the TFEU and thus 
formally satisfies the first condition laid down in article 48(6) 
TEU. However, the Irish Supreme Court also sought to ascertain 
whether the decision encroaches on the Union’s competence in 
                                                                                                                                     
23. Thomas Pringle v. Gov’t of Ireland, Case C-370/12, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 30 
(delivered Nov. 27, 2012).  
24. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 35 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012). For a closer 
analysis, see View of Advocate General Kokott, Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 18–33 
(delivered Oct. 26, 2012). 
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the area of monetary policy and in the area of the coordination 
of the economic policies of the Member States. 
The CJEU concluded that the decision was not capable of 
affecting the Union’s exclusive competence in the area of 
monetary policy as laid down in article 3(1)(c) TFEU. If it had 
ruled otherwise, this would have made the use of the simplified 
revision procedure unlawful. Since article 3(1)(c) TFEU is to be 
found in Part One of the TFEU, the amendment envisaged by 
the decision could in that event only have been adopted by 
using the more cumbersome ordinary revision procedure.25 The 
Court, however, found, in light of the objectives to be attained 
by the ESM,26 the instruments provided to achieve those 
objectives, and the close link between the ESM and the TFEU 
provisions relating to economic policy and the regulatory 
framework for strengthened economic governance of the Union 
(i.e., the ‘Six-Pack’),27 that the establishment of the ESM falls 
within the area of economic policy.28 Indeed, Mr. Pringle could 
have guessed this simply by studying the TFEU more closely. 
The legal basis for Union financial assistance to Member States 
facing severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or 
exceptional occurrences29 can be found in Chapter 1 of Title 
VIII, entitled ‘Economic Policy.’ Still, it is useful that the Court 
clarified this point with additional arguments. Mr. Pringle’s 
claim that financial assistance under the ESM is essentially 
                                                                                                                                     
25. TEU, supra note 2, arts. 48(2)–(5), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 42. 
26. According to the Court, the objective pursued by the ESM, which is to 
safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole, is clearly distinct from the primary 
objective of the Union’s monetary policy under articles 127(1) and 282(2) TFEU to 
maintain price stability. See Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 56 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012). 
27. The term ‘Six-Pack’ refers to a set of secondary EU law measures that entered 
into force on December 13, 2011. See Council Regulation No. 1173/2011/EU on the 
Effective Enforcement of Budgetary Surveillance in the Euro Area, 2011 O.J. L 306/1; 
Council Regulation No. 1174/2011/EU on Enforcement Measures to Correct Excessive 
Macroeconomic Imbalances in the Euro Area, 2011 O.J. L 306/8; Council Regulation 
No. 1175/2011/EU on the Strengthening of the Surveillance and Coordination of 
Economic Policies (amending Regulation No. 1466/97/EC), 2011 O.J. L 306/12; 
Council Regulation No. 1176/2011/EU on the Prevention and Correction of 
Macroeconomic Imbalances, 2011 O.J. L 306/25; Council Regulation No. 
1177/2011/EU on Speeding Up and Clarifying the Implementation of the Excessive 
Deficit Procedure (amending Regulation No. 1467/97/EC), 2011 O.J. L 306/33; 
Council Directive 2011/85/EU on Requirements for Budgetary Frameworks of the 
Member States, 2011 O.J. L 306/41. 
28. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 60 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012). . 
29. TFEU, supra note 2, art. 122(2), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 98. 
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monetary in character was rightly dismissed. An economic policy 
measure, the Court stated, cannot be treated as equivalent to a 
monetary policy measure for the sole reason that it may have 
indirect effects on the stability of the single currency.30 
Next, the Court made a crucial observation on the division 
of competences in the area of economic policy. Since articles 
2(3) and 5(1) TFEU, according to the Court, restrict the role of 
the Union to the adoption of coordinating measures, the Union 
Treaties “do not confer any specific power on the Union to 
establish a stability mechanism of the kind envisaged by Decision 
2011/199.”31 The Court conceded that article 122(2) TFEU 
confers on the Union the power to grant ad hoc financial 
assistance to individual Member States. It considered that article 
122(2) TFEU is nevertheless not an appropriate legal basis for 
the establishment of a permanent stability mechanism, the 
objectives of which are to safeguard the stability of the euro area 
as a whole.32 Accordingly, the Court ruled, the euro area Member 
States are entitled to conclude between themselves an 
agreement such as the ESM Treaty, provided they do not 
disregard their duty to comply with EU law.33 It thus follows that 
the decision satisfies the condition laid down in article 48(6) 
TEU that an amendment of the TFEU by means of the 
                                                                                                                                     
30. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 56 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012). The Court’s 
statement reflects the view of Advocate General (“AG”) Kokott, who added that to hold 
otherwise would lead to the conclusion that economic policy would in its entirety be 
reserved to the European System of Central Banks (“ESCB”). The rules of the TFEU 
on the coordination of economic policy would thereby be devoid of meaning. See View 
of Advocate General Kokott, Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 85 (delivered Oct. 26, 
2012) 
31. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 64 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012) (emphasis added). 
32. Id. ¶ 65. Note that the Court here discreetly settled a disagreement between 
the President of the Commission and the other Members of the European Council. 
The European Council Conclusions of December 16–17, 2010, which formally 
announced that a permanent stability mechanism would be established to safeguard 
the stability of the euro area as a whole, state that the European Council agreed that 
article 122(2) TFEU would no longer be needed for such purposes. See Eur. Council, 
Conclusions of December 16–17, 2010, at 1 (Jan. 2011), available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/
118578.pdf. The Conclusions also affirm that the Heads of State or Government agreed 
that article 122(2) TFEU should therefore not be used for such purposes. See id. This 
implies that the President of the Commission was of the opinion that article 122(2) 
TFEU could be used as a legal basis. 
33. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 68–69 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012). 
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simplified revision procedure may concern only Part Three of 
that Treaty.34 
B. Question 2: The Compatibility of the ESM Treaty with EU Law 
With the second preliminary question the Irish Supreme 
Court sought to ascertain whether various articles in the Union 
Treaties,35 as well as the general principles of effective judicial 
protection and legal certainty, preclude the euro area Member 
States from concluding and ratifying an agreement such as the 
ESM Treaty.36 
1. Compatibility with the ‘No-Bailout’ Clause of Article 125 
TFEU 
Surely the most eagerly anticipated part of the judgment 
was the Court’s interpretation of the ‘no-bailout’ clause laid 
down in article 125(1) TFEU. The question was essentially 
whether the stability support by the ESM and the rules relating 
to capital calls are ‘bailouts’ captured by article 125 TFEU.37 The 
length of the answer provided by Advocate General (“AG”) 
Kokott—roughly a third of her View—reflects the difficult 
position in which both she and the Court found themselves.38 
On the basis of the wording of article 125 TFEU, the Court 
found that the ‘no-bailout’ clause was not intended to prohibit 
all forms of financial assistance by the Union or the Member 
States.39 If that were the case, the Court explained, article 122(2) 
TFEU, which allows the Union to grant ad hoc financial 
assistance, would have had to state that it derogated from article 
125 TFEU.40 Indeed, as has been argued in the literature, a 
                                                                                                                                     
34. Id. ¶ 70. 
35. For the full list of articles, see supra Section I. 
36. The second question was ruled partly inadmissible insofar as it concerned the 
interpretation of articles 2 and 3 TEU and the general principle of legal certainty. See 
Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 82–91 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012). 
37. See View of Advocate General Kokott, Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 101–03 
(delivered Oct. 26, 2012). 
38. Id. ¶¶ 104–66. Unlike the Court, AG Kokott carefully sets out why she 
considers ESM financial assistance to fall within the personal scope of article 125(1) 
TFEU, which is not addressed to an independent international organization such as the 
ESM. See id. ¶¶ 106–12. 
39. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 130 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012). 
40. Id. ¶ 131. 
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broad interpretation of article 125 TFEU would render article 
122(2) TFEU meaningless.41 Since the stricter wording of article 
123 TFEU also supports the view that the ‘no-bailout’ clause 
does not completely prohibit financial assistance, the Court 
proceeded by examining which forms of financial assistance are 
compatible with article 125 TFEU having regard to the objective 
thereof.42 
The Court found that article 125 TFEU only prohibits the 
Union and the Member States from granting financial assistance 
that diminishes the incentive of the recipient Member State to 
conduct a sound budgetary policy.43 It argued that the ‘no-
bailout’ clause “ensures that Member States remain subject to 
the logic of the market when they enter into debt, since that 
ought to prompt them to maintain budgetary discipline.”44 The 
important disciplinary pressure of market forces on the 
borrowing activities of the Member States was identified as the 
objective of the ‘no-bailout’ clause early on.45 The Court 
identified, however, a higher objective. Compliance with 
budgetary discipline, it held, contributes to the attainment of 
the financial stability of the monetary union. In a nod to the 
ECB,46 the Court determined that financial assistance by the 
ESM is not compatible with article 125 TFEU unless it is 
indispensable for the safeguarding of the financial stability as a 
whole and subject to strict conditions.47 
                                                                                                                                     
41. Jean-Victor Louis, Guest Editorial, The No-Bailout Clause and Rescue Packages, 47 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 971, 983–84 (2010) (citing Ulrich Häde, Haushaltsdisziplin und 
Solidarität im Zeichen des Finanzkrise, 20 EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 399 (2009)). 
42. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 132–33 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012). See also 
View of Advocate General Kokott, Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 141 (delivered Oct. 
26, 2012). 
43. Id. ¶ 136. 
44. Id. ¶ 135. 
45. Jörn Pipkorn, Legal Arrangements in the Treaty of Maastricht for the Effectiveness of 
the Economic and Monetary Union, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 263, 275 (1994). 
46. The Court referenced the Opinion of the ECB of March 17, 2011, on the 
Draft Decision Amending Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union with Regard to a Stability Mechanism for Member States whose Currency is the 
Euro (CON/2011/24), 2011 O.J. C 140/8, ¶ 5. With this little nod, the Court found a 
smart way to reconstruct the scope of article 125 TFEU with the use of the terminology 
found in article 136(3) TFEU without actually having to refer to the yet-to-be-inserted 
provision itself. 
47. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 136 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012). 
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To get to this conclusion, the Court did something quite 
remarkable. Likely inspired by AG Kokott,48 the Court referred 
to the preparatory work relating to the Maastricht Treaty to 
support its finding that the aim of article 125 TFEU is to ensure 
that the Member States follow a sound budgetary policy.49 It is 
certainly not uncommon to have recourse to the travaux 
préparatoires of a treaty as a supplementary means of 
interpretation under international law,50 or for that matter in 
the national context. However, one hardly ever encounters it in 
the context of primary EU law. Still, this unusual move should 
not be seen as a strained way of justifying a predetermined 
outcome. Rather, by emphasizing the original intent of the 
drafters of the Maastricht Treaty (i.e., the Member States), the 
Court added legitimacy to its seemingly novel interpretation of 
the ‘no-bailout’ clause. 
The Court’s overall conclusion was that article 125 TFEU 
does not prohibit the Member States from granting financial 
assistance to each other via the ESM. It considered that grants of 
financial assistance by way of credit lines or loans51 do not imply 
that the ESM will assume the debts of a recipient ESM Member, 
but amounts to the creation of new debt. It pointed out that a 
recipient ESM Member remains responsible for its commitments 
to its creditors with respect to its existing debt.52 Other stability 
support facilities such as the purchase of bonds on the primary 
and secondary markets,53 too, do not lead the ESM to assume 
the debts of a recipient ESM Member.54 Therefore, at least from 
                                                                                                                                     
48. See View of Advocate General Kokott, Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 128–31 
(delivered Oct. 26, 2012). 
49. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 135 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012). Both the AG and 
the Court point out that the prohibition contained in article 125 TFEU finds its origin 
in article 104b of the Treaty establishing the European Community, as inserted by the 
Maastricht Treaty in November 1993. See View of Advocate General Kokott, Pringle, 
[2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 128 (delivered Oct. 26, 2012); Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 
134 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012).  
50. See 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]. Note that such interpretation is understood to be 
complementary to the general rule of interpretation, as laid down in article 31 VCLT. 
See generally MARK E. VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON 
THE LAW OF TREATIES 446–48 (2009). 
51. TESM, supra note 1, arts. 14–16. 
52. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 139 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012). 
53. TESM, supra note 1, arts. 17, 18. 
54. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 140–41 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012). 
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a legal perspective, the ESM will not act as the guarantor of the 
debts of that ESM Member. It thus follows that article 125 TFEU 
does not preclude the conclusion or ratification of the ESM 
Treaty by the euro area Member States.55 
2. Compatibility with Exclusive Union Competences in the Area 
of Monetary Policy and Under Article 3(2) TFEU 
The ECB and the central banks of the euro area Member 
States, which together constitute the Eurosystem, conduct the 
Union’s monetary policy.56 In carrying out this exclusive 
competence, their objective is to maintain price stability.57 
Repeating its earlier findings, the Court dismissed the 
applicant’s claim that the activities of the ESM affect price 
stability in the euro area and therefore encroach upon the 
Union’s monetary policy. The TFEU provisions relating to the 
Union’s exclusive competence,58 the Court held, do not 
preclude the conclusion or ratification of the ESM Treaty.59 
As the preamble of the ESM Treaty states that the ESM will 
assume the tasks currently fulfilled by the EFSF and EFSM,60 the 
Irish Supreme Court inquired whether the Union’s competence 
under article 3(2) TFEU precludes the euro area Member States 
from concluding or ratifying the ESM Treaty. That provision 
stipulates that the Union shall have exclusive competence to 
conclude international agreements when the conclusion thereof 
may affect common rules or alter their scope.61 The Court 
                                                                                                                                     
55. As was noted above, Mr. Pringle also claimed that the rules related to capital 
calls are caught by the prohibition of article 125 TFEU. The Court dismissed this claim, 
pointing out that in accordance with article 25(2) TESM, a defaulting ESM Member 
remains bound to pay its part of the capital. The other ESM Members thus do not act 
as guarantors of the debt of that ESM Member. See Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 145 
(delivered Nov. 27, 2012); cf. View of Advocate General Kokott, Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. 
I____, ¶¶ 161–65 (delivered Oct. 26, 2012). 
56. TFEU, supra note 2, art. 282(1), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 167; Protocol (No. 4) on 
the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central 
Bank, 2012 O.J. C 326/230, at 230 (annexed to the Union Treaties art. 1). 
57. TFEU, supra note 2, arts. 127(1), 282(2), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 102, 167. 
58. Id. arts. 3(1)(c), 127, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 51, 102. 
59. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 93–98 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012). 
60. See Preamble to TESM, supra note 1. 
61. Article 3(2) TFEU reads as follows: “The Union shall also have exclusive 
competence for the conclusion of an international agreement when its conclusion is 
provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is necessary to enable the Union to 
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considered that since the EFSF was established outside the 
Union framework, the assumption of its tasks by the ESM in any 
event cannot have such effects. Nor does the conclusion or 
ratification of the ESM Treaty jeopardize the objective pursued 
by article 122(2) TFEU or the EFSM Regulation.62 Therefore, 
the Court stressed once more that the TFEU does not confer a 
specific power on the Union to establish a permanent stability 
mechanism.63 The Union, it argued, is furthermore not 
prevented by the establishment of the ESM from granting ad hoc 
financial assistance to Member States under article 122(2) 
TFEU.64 
3. Compatibility with Union Competences in the Area of 
Economic Policy and the Prohibition of Monetary Financing 
Mr. Pringle had suggested that the conditions attached to 
financial assistance granted by the ESM serve the same function 
as the Council recommendations under articles 121 and 126 
TFEU, and therefore unlawfully encroach on Union 
competence.65 Those conditions, the Court explained, may very 
well take the form of macro-economic adjustment programs, but 
they do not constitute an instrument for the coordination of the 
economic policies of the Member States, as do the provisions 
mentioned above. It stated that these conditions are instead 
intended to ensure that the activities of the ESM are consistent 
with EU law.66 The ESM Treaty indeed expressly provides that 
the Memorandum of Understanding (“MoU”) detailing the 
conditionality attached to the financial assistance granted to an 
ESM Member is fully consistent with the measures of economic 
policy coordination in the TFEU.67 Coordination of the 
                                                                                                                                     
exercise its internal competence, or in so far as its conclusion may affect common rules or 
alter their scope.” TFEU, supra note 2, art. 3(2), O.J. 2012 C 326, at 51 (emphasis added). 
62. See supra note 18. 
63. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 105 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012) (referring to 
paragraphs 64 to 66). 
64. Id. ¶¶ 104, 106. 
65. View of Advocate General Kokott, Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 89 (delivered 
Oct. 26, 2012). 
66. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 108–12, 114 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012). 
67. As one of the European Council’s agents in the Pringle case has put it (writing 
in a personal capacity), the objective of the provision of consistency found in article 
13(3) TESM is “to avoid building a rival universe of economic coordination outside the 
EU Treaties.” See Alberto de Gregorio Merino, Legal Developments in the Economic and 
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economic policies of the Member States via the ESM is out of 
the question, as AG Kokott clarified, “for the simple reason that 
the conditions represent the requirements of the ESM as 
imposed on an individual Member State and not a 
harmonization of the individual economic policies of the 
Member States.”68 
The AG is right. While the ESM and other financial 
assistance mechanisms go hand in hand with strengthened 
economic policy coordination,69 they were certainly not 
designed for that purpose. Her choice of wording is noteworthy, 
though. With the phrase “imposed on an individual Member 
State,” the AG openly suggests recipient Member States may 
have little choice but to accept the far-reaching austerity 
measures demanded by the “Troika” composed of the European 
Commission, the ECB, and the International Monetary Fund 
(“IMF”). As such, it is probably an apt description of the 
political reality of negotiations between creditor and recipient 
Member States.70 
In relation to article 122(2) TFEU, the Irish Supreme Court 
asked whether that provision exhaustively defines the 
exceptional circumstances in which it is possible to grant 
financial assistance to Member States and whether it empowers 
solely the Union’s institutions to grant financial assistance.71 Mr. 
Pringle argued that the ESM encroaches on the Union’s 
competence to grant financial assistance under article 122(2) 
TFEU. In his view, financial assistance via the ESM goes beyond 
the conditions set out in that provision. Article 122(2) TFEU 
holds that the Council may grant financial assistance if a 
                                                                                                                                     
Monetary Union During the Debt Crisis: The Mechanisms of Financial Assistance, 49 COMMON 
MKT. L. REV. 1613, 1635–36 (2012). Even without such provisions, though, EU law 
would of course prevail in case of conflict on the basis of the principle of primacy of EU 
law. 
68. View of Advocate General Kokott, Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 92 (delivered 
Oct. 26, 2012). 
69. See, e.g., Preamble to TESM, supra note 1. 
70. View of Advocate General Kokott, Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 92 (delivered 
Oct. 26, 2012). The official reading is of course that the European Commission (on 
behalf of the ESM), in liaison with the ECB and, wherever possible, together with the 
IMF, and the Member State concerned negotiate the Memorandum of Understanding 
(“MoU”) detailing the conditionality attached to stability support. This implies equality 
of the negotiating partners. Cf. TESM, supra note 1, art. 13(3). 
71. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 117 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012). 
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Member State faces severe difficulties caused by natural disasters 
or exceptional occurrences beyond its control. Thus, only the Union 
may grant financial assistance—not the Member States or the 
ESM—and only in the event that the difficulties faced by the 
recipient Member State are exceptional and unforeseeable in 
nature. Budgetary difficulties or financing problems, argued Mr. 
Pringle, do not fall under that category.72 In this regard, it 
should be mentioned that the EFSM Regulation explicitly 
characterized the sovereign debt crisis as such an exceptional 
situation, caused by the global financial crisis.73 The ESM Treaty 
does not. However, the controversy surrounding the legal basis 
of the EFSM Regulation appears to have been the main reason 
why the Member States decided to amend article 136 TFEU.74 
The Court did not answer the Irish Supreme Court’s first 
question concerning article 122(2) TFEU. Instead, in answering 
the second question, it drew a clear distinction between 
financial assistance granted by the Union and financial 
assistance granted by the Member States (via the ESM). As the 
establishment of the ESM does not affect the Union’s exercise of 
competence and nothing in article 122 TFEU indicates that the 
Union has exclusive competence to grant financial assistance to a 
Member State, the Court found that the Member States remain 
free to establish a stability mechanism such as the ESM.75 This is 
subject to the proviso that the ESM in its operation complies 
with EU law, as the Court had already settled.76 
The Irish Supreme Court had asked, furthermore, whether 
the ESM Treaty was not in reality intended to circumvent the 
prohibition of monetary financing found in article 123 TFEU.77 
Again, the CJEU noted that the provision concerned is not 
addressed to the Member States. Because article 123 TFEU is 
                                                                                                                                     
72. Written observations of Thomas Pringle in Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v. 
Gov’t of Ireland, ¶ 3.39 (on file with the author). 
73. EFSM Regulation, supra note 18, pmbl. 
74. Bruno de Witte, The European Treaty Amendment for the Creation of a Financial 
Stability Mechanism, SIEPS EUR. POLICY ANALYSIS, June 2011, at 6. On the use of article 
122.2 TFEU as the legal basis for the EFSM Regulation, see, for example, Kaarlo Tuori, 
The European Financial Crisis—Constitutional Aspects and Implications 28 (Eur. Univ. Inst. 
Working Paper Law No. 2012/28), and the literature cited therein. 
75. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 118–21 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012). 
76. Id. ¶ 121 (referring to ¶¶ 68–69, 111–13). 
77. Id. ¶ 124. 
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specifically addressed to the ECB and the national central banks, 
the grant of financial assistance by a group of Member States is 
simply not covered by the prohibition. The euro area Member 
States are thus not “circumventing” article 123 TFEU when they 
act via the ESM, the Court explained, because they are not 
derogating from the prohibition laid down in that article.78 The 
Court added that there is currently no basis for the view that the 
funds provided to the ESM might be derived from financial 
instruments prohibited by article 123(1) TFEU.79 This short 
statement will surely inform ongoing discussions about the 
possibility of granting the ESM a banking license, which would 
allow it to borrow from the ECB and therefore significantly 
bolster the ESM’s firepower. For the moment, it remains unclear 
whether that would be consistent with article 123(1) TFEU in 
the eyes of the Court.80 
4. The Allocation of New Tasks to the European Commission 
and the ECB 
As was the case with the Greek Loan Facility and the EFSF, 
the ESM ‘borrows’ the European Commission and the ECB.81 
For that reason, the Irish Supreme Court asked whether the 
allocation of new tasks to these institutions is compatible with 
their respective powers. Besides taking part in the meetings of 
the ESM’s Board of Governors and Board of Directors as 
observers,82 the Commission and the ECB carry out executive 
tasks as part of the Troika (together with the IMF). They are 
entrusted to assess requests for stability support by ESM 
Members,83 assess the urgency thereof,84 negotiate the MoU 
                                                                                                                                     
78. Id. ¶¶ 125–26. 
79. Id. ¶ 127. 
80. See Pieter-Augustijn van Malleghem, Pringle: A Paradigm Shift in the European 
Union’s Monetary Constitution, 14 GERMAN L. J. 141, 159 (2013). 
81. To this end, the twenty-seven Member States, via an executive agreement 
under international law, by common accord authorized the euro area Member States to 
request the Commission and the ECB to perform the tasks set out in the ESM Treaty. 
See Preamble to TESM, supra note 1; Council Document 12114/11, Decision of the 
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States of the European Union (June 24, 
2011), available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/11/st12/st12114.
en11.pdf. 
82. TESM, supra note 1, arts. 5(3), 6(2). 
83. Id. art. 13(1). 
84. Id. art. 4(4). 
2013] THE PRINGLE JUDGMENT 129 
detailing the conditionality attached to financial assistance,85 
and monitor compliance with that conditionality.86 Such use of 
the institutions outside the framework of the Union Treaties is 
certainly not unprecedented. In fact, the Court had previously 
held that the Member States are not precluded from entrusting 
management and coordination tasks to the institutions in areas 
of non-exclusive competence.87 
Those tasks, however, must be compatible with the powers 
conferred by the Union Treaties and may not alter their 
essential character. To put it differently, the Member States are 
allowed to allocate new tasks to the institutions as long as their 
competences, as defined by the Union Treaties, remain 
unchanged. Since the objective of the ESM Treaty is to ensure 
the financial stability of the euro area as a whole, the Court held, 
the Commission’s involvement in the ESM Treaty promotes the 
general interest of the Union and therefore complies with the 
Court’s case law.88 Similarly, by virtue of its duties within the 
ESM, the ECB supports the general economic policies in the 
Union, the Court argued. Therefore, the tasks allocated to the 
ECB under the ESM Treaty are compatible with its tasks under 
the Union Treaties.89 
5. The Jurisdiction of the Court to Decide on ESM-Related 
Disputes 
The Court’s assessment of its own jurisdiction to decide on 
disputes in connection with the interpretation and application 
of the ESM Treaty, under article 37(3) thereof, is one of the less 
convincing parts of the judgment. Article 273 TFEU, on which 
the Court’s jurisdiction is directly based,90 holds that it shall have 
jurisdiction in any dispute between Member States relating to 
                                                                                                                                     
85. Id. art. 13(3). 
86. Id. art. 13(7). 
87. Parliament v. Council and Commission (Bangladesh), Joined Cases C-181/91 & 
C-248/91, [1993] E.C.R. I-3685; Parliament v. Council (Lomé IV Convention), Case C-
316/91, [1994] E.C.R. I-625. 
88. Thomas Pringle v. Gov’t of Ireland, Case C-370/12, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 
163–64 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012); cf. TEU, supra note 2, art. 17(1), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 
25. 
89. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 165 (delivered November 27, 2012); cf. TFEU, 
supra note 2, art. 282(2), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 167. 
90. See Preamble to TESM, supra note 1. 
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the subject matter of the Union Treaties if the dispute is 
submitted to the Court under a special agreement.91 The link 
with EU law is undeniable. Yet, article 37(2) TESM distinguishes 
two types of disputes: those between ESM Members and those 
between an ESM Member and the ESM itself. Given that the 
ESM is an independent international organization, this second 
category—formally at least—does not easily fit the description 
‘between Member States.’ 
As becomes clear from article 37(3) TESM, disputes of the 
second category occur when an ESM Member contests a 
decision of the Board of Governors, an organ of the ESM acting 
by qualified majority.92 Legally speaking, the Court’s assertion 
that a dispute to which the ESM is a party can be considered to 
be a ‘dispute between Member States’ since membership of the 
ESM consists solely of EU Member States may not be entirely 
correct. It is noteworthy in this respect that the Member States 
themselves were initially unsure whether this type of dispute 
would fit the wording of article 273 TFEU, as is demonstrated by 
article 16(2) of the EFSF Framework Agreement.93 That 
provision, too, distinguishes disputes between euro area 
Member States only and disputes between the euro area 
Member States and the EFSF, the ESM’s direct predecessor. 
Disputes of the latter category are to be submitted to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of Luxembourg—not the 
CJEU.94 Therefore, a more thorough reasoning by the Court 
would have been welcome. 
Be that as it may, the Court’s pragmatic approach here 
obviously aims at preserving the autonomy of the EU legal 
system and is therefore preferable over a strict reading of article 
                                                                                                                                     
91. According to the Court, given the objective pursued by article 273 TFEU, such 
agreement can be given in advance with reference to a whole class of predefined 
disputes, in casu by means of article 37(3) TESM. See Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 172 
(delivered November 27, 2012). 
92. TESM, supra note 1, arts. 4(5), 5(7)(m). This makes a decision on a dispute 
distinct from instances in which the Member States collectively exercise their powers 
under public international law. 
93. The EFSF Framework Agreement of June 7, 2010, is an agreement concluded 
between the EFSF and the euro area Member States as shareholders of the EFSF. 
94. Article 16(2) of the EFSF Framework Agreement provides that a dispute 
arising from or in the context of the Agreement, to the extent it constitutes a dispute 
between euro area Member States only, shall be submitted to the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the CJEU. No mention is made, however, of article 273 TFEU. 
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273 TFEU. That provision should be read in conjunction with 
article 344 TFEU, which obliges Member States not to submit 
disputes on the interpretation or application of the Union 
Treaties to any method of settlement other than those provided 
for therein.95 As such, articles 273 and 344 TFEU were 
specifically designed to protect the unity of EU law and the 
interpretation thereof. Since the ESM’s Board of Governors is de 
facto just another ‘guise’ of the euro area Member States closely 
connected to the Eurogroup,96 and the ESM Treaty is 
inextricably linked with the EMU, the Court is in the best 
position to adjudicate ESM-related disputes. 
C. Question 3: The Legal (In)Significance of Article 136(3) TFEU 
The Court’s answer to the third preliminary question might 
appear remarkably brief, even cryptic. But, to be fair, the answer 
was rather obvious. The Irish Supreme Court essentially asked 
whether the euro area Member States were allowed to conclude 
and ratify the ESM Treaty prior to the entry into force of the 
decision amending article 136 TFEU. In December 2010, as Mr. 
Pringle of course pointed out, the European Council explicitly 
stated that the TFEU “should be amended in order for a 
permanent mechanism to be established” by the euro area 
Member States.97 However, when the hearings in Luxembourg 
took place, the ESM had recently been inaugurated.98 
                                                                                                                                     
95. On this obligation, see Commission v. Ireland (Mox Plant), Case C-459/03, 
[2006] E.C.R. I-4642. 
96. Meetings of the Board of Governors usually take place in the margin of 
Eurogroup meetings, which are itself informal meetings scheduled ahead of regular 
Economic and Financial Affairs Council (“ECOFIN”) meetings. The Chairman of the 
Board of Governors is currently Dutch Finance Minister Jeroen Dijsselbloem, who is 
also the President of the Eurogroup. 
97. European Council 16–17 Dec. 2010 Conclusions, supra note 32, at 1. Note that 
European Council Decision 2011/199 does not refer to the aforementioned statement, 
but to the European Council of October 28-29, 2010, at which the Heads of State or 
Government agreed on the need to establish a permanent crisis mechanism and invited 
President Van Rompuy to undertake consultations with the members of the European 
Council on “a limited treaty change to that effect.” Id. 
98. The ESM Treaty entered into force for sixteen Contracting Parties on 
September 27, 2012. On that day, to ensure conformity with the judgment of the 
German Federal Constitutional Court of September 12, 2012, representatives of the 
Contracting Parties issued an interpretive declaration on articles 8(5), 32(5), 34, and 
35(1) TESM, supra note 1. On October 4, 2012, Estonia was the final Contracting Party 
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Meanwhile, the decision amending article 136 TFEU was still 
pending approval by all twenty-seven Member States.99 So, when 
the European Council, backed by the Member States and the 
Commission, argued at the hearings that article 136(3) TFEU is 
a purely declaratory provision, the contradiction with its earlier 
assertion as to the necessity of the amendment was evident. The 
Court nonetheless sided with the European Council. Referring 
to earlier parts of the judgment, it merely stated that the 
amendment of article 136 TFEU by the decision confirms the 
existence of a power possessed by the Member States.100 
Indeed, any other view on the legal significance of article 
136(3) TFEU likely rests on the misconception that this 
provision serves as a legal basis or authorization for the 
establishment of the ESM. Seeing as the ESM Treaty was 
concluded by the euro area Member States under public 
international law, there was, in any event, simply no need for a 
legal basis. Since the Court found that the right of a Member 
State to conclude and ratify the ESM Treaty is not subject to the 
entry into force of the decision,101 it is now also abundantly clear 
that article 136(3) TFEU does not serve as an authorization for 
the establishment of the ESM.102 Member States may have 
limited their sovereign rights by transferring powers to the 
Union, but their capacity to conclude treaties remains intact. 
The fact that the ESM Treaty is in substance closely related to 
                                                                                                                                     
to ratify the ESM Treaty. The ESM was inaugurated in the margins of a Eurogroup 
meeting on October 8, 2012. 
99. Decision 2011/199 did not as foreseen enter into force on January 1, 2013, 
because the relevant bill was still awaiting Presidential approval in the Czech Republic, 
despite having been approved by both houses of parliament. See Directorate General 
for Internal Policies, Policy Department C, Article 136 TFEU, ESM, Fiscal Stability 
Treaty—Ratification requirements and present situation in the Member States, Eur. 
Parl. Doc. PE 462.455 (2013). The Decision eventually entered into force on May 1, 
2013 
100. Thomas Pringle v. Gov’t of Ireland, Case C-370/12, [2012] E.C.R. I____, 
¶ 172 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012) (referring to paragraphs 68, 72, and 109). 
101. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 185 (delivered November 27, 2012). 
102. Note that the German Federal Constitutional Court holds a different view. In 
its ESM ruling, that Court referred to article 136(3) TFEU as an “Öffnungsklausel” and 
argued that the provision “opens up” to the euro area Member States the possibility of 
establishing the ESM on the basis of an agreement under international law. See 
Bundesverfassungsgericht [Bverfg] [Federal Constitutional Court] Sept. 12, 2012, 2 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS  [BVERFGE] 1390/12, ¶¶ 233, 
236 (Ger.). 
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the law of the EMU does not mean that it is formally part of the 
EU legal order. Consequently, from an international law point 
of view, the entry into force of the ESM Treaty was also not 
contingent upon EU law. This is why it could precede the 
amendment of article 136 TFEU. 
This does not mean that the proposed insertion of article 
136(3) TFEU was never more than an attempt by the German 
government to placate the judges in Karlsruhe,103 or a message 
to financial markets without legal added value. Writing prior to 
the judgment, De Gregorio Merino suggested that article 136(3) 
TFEU should be seen as a “provision of a fundamental 
interpretative value” that provides legal certainty as to the 
compatibility of the ESM with article 125 TFEU.104 The new 
provision, he argued, would introduce the preservation of the 
stability of the euro area as a new Treaty objective and reconcile 
this with the objective of monetary stability founded on 
budgetary discipline, as guaranteed by article 125 TFEU. As De 
Gregorio Merino rightly noted, in the Union Treaties the term 
‘stability’ was hitherto only used in relation to price stability.105 
Article 136(3) TFEU did in fact prove to be a useful 
interpretative tool, as the Court cleverly reconstructed the scope 
of article 125 TFEU using terminology found in the yet-to-be-
inserted Treaty provision without explicitly referencing it.106 
Seeing as articles 3 and 12(1) TESM mirror the wording of 
article 136(3) TFEU, this made it especially easy for the Court to 
positively assess the compatibility of the ESM Treaty with the 
‘no-bailout’ clause.107 At the same time, this also means that 
there is no longer a need to reconcile the two concepts of 
stability. After all, the Court identified the preservation of the 
financial stability of the monetary union as a “higher objective” 
                                                                                                                                     
103. Nikolas Busse, EU-Vertrag: Ein Brüsseler Gipfel für die Karlsruher Richter, 
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Dec. 17, 2010, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/
politik/europaeische-union/eu-vertrag-ein-bruesseler-gipfel-fuer-die-karlsruher-richter-
11079015.html. 
104. De Gregorio Merino, supra note 67, at 1629. 
105. Id. 
106. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 136–37 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012). Instead, 
the Court relied on the Opinion of the ECB, supra note 48, the wording of which was of 
course directly inspired by Decision 2011/199. 
107. Id. ¶ 142. 
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of article 125 TFEU itself.108 Consequently, article 136(3) TFEU 
is now bereft of any legal purpose besides confirming an already 
existing power of the euro area Member States. 
III. COMMENTS 
Member States often display a schizophrenic attitude 
towards EU law and the institutional arrangements laid down in 
the Union Treaties when guarding their prerogatives as 
sovereign states. This is most apparent in the area of economic 
policy. The drafters of the Maastricht Treaty, hesitant to 
relinquish powers to the Union, originally created a decidedly 
asymmetric legal framework for the EMU. Whereas the euro 
area Member States have fully transferred the sovereignty to 
pursue monetary policy to the European System of Central 
Banks (“ESCB”),109 articles 2(3) and 5(1) TFEU still “restrict the 
role of the Union in the area of economic policy to the adoption 
of coordinating measures.”110 The introduction to this Article 
suggests that, in light of the judgment, it is perhaps more 
appropriate to think of the EMU as an ‘Economic and/or 
Monetary Union’ rather than an Economic and Monetary 
Union. As Pringle shows, the compatibility of the ESM Treaty 
with EU law hinges essentially on the characterization of 
economic policy as a sui generis category of Union 
competences.111 This final section will illustrate that the euro 
area Member States are, however, to a great degree bound by 
the Union Treaties. It will furthermore argue that a permanent 
stability mechanism could also have been established as a Union 
instrument and an explanation will be given as to why that 
would have been preferable. 
                                                                                                                                     
108. Id. ¶ 135. 
109. See TFEU, supra note 2, arts. 3(1)(c), 127(2), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 51, 102; 
Protocol (No. 4), supra note 56, art. 3(1), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 231. 
110. Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 64 (delivered Nov. 27, 2012). 
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attempt by the Member States to guard their (perceived) autonomy. See René Smits, 
The European Constitution and EMU: An Appraisal, 42 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 425, 430–31 
(2005) (citing Koen Lenaerts, The Structure of the Union According to the Draft Constitution 
for Europe, in THE EUROPEAN UNION: AN ONGOING PROCESS OF INTEGRATION 3, 20 
(Jaap W. de Zwaan et al. eds., 2004)). 
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A. Euro Area Member States and the Debt Crisis: Free to Do as They 
Please? 
The economic policies of the Member States and the single 
monetary policy are inextricably related. In a monetary union, a 
Member State’s fiscal policy choices may have considerable 
negative effects on the others. Therefore, Member States are 
required to coordinate their economic policies within the 
Union, notably on the basis of broad economic policy 
guidelines112 within the context of the multilateral surveillance 
procedure.113 In doing so, the Member States shall act in 
compliance with three guiding principles: stable prices, sound 
public finances, and a sustainable balance of payments.114 As 
regards the principle of sound public finances, the disregard of 
which arguably lies at the heart of the sovereign debt crisis, 
article 126(1) TFEU unequivocally states that Member States 
shall avoid excessive government deficits. To this end, article 
126 TFEU lays down the excessive deficit procedure.115 A 
protocol annexed to the Union Treaties sets the limits on 
planned or actual government deficit (3% of GDP) and 
government debt (60% of GDP).116 Already in 2003, this 
framework, as augmented by the Stability and Growth Pact 
(“SGP”), proved insufficiently strict to keep Member States in 
line.117 
The sovereign debt crisis painfully exposed the 
shortcomings of the above-described legal framework. Efforts to 
                                                                                                                                     
112. TFEU, supra note 2, art. 121(2), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 97. 
113. The multilateral surveillance procedure is provided for in TFEU, supra note 
2, art. 121(3)–(4), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 97–98. Further rules are contained in the 
‘preventive arm’ of the Stability and Growth Pact (“SGP”). See Surveillance and 
Coordination of Economic Policies, supra note 27. 
114. TFEU, supra note 2, arts. 119(3), 120, 121(1), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 96–97. 
115. The excessive deficit procedure is provided for in TFEU, supra note 2, art. 
126(2)–(13), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 100–01. Further rules are contained in the ‘dissuasive 
arm’ of the SGP. See  Excessive Deficit Procedure, supra note 27. 
116. See Protocol (No. 12) on the Excessive Deficit Procedure, 2012 O.J. C 
326/279. 
117. On the SGP, its ineffectiveness in the 2000s, and subsequent reforms, see 
Matthias J. Herdegen, Price Stability and Budgetary Restraints in the Economic and Monetary 
Union: The Law as Guardian of Economic Wisdom, 35 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 9 (1998); 
Fabian Amtenbrink & Jakob de Haan, Economic Governance in the European Union: Fiscal 
Policy Discipline Versus Flexibility, 40 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1075 (2003); Jean-Victor 
Louis, The Review of the Stability and Growth Pact, 43 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 85 (2006). 
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reinforce economic governance within the euro area, such as 
the European Semester, the Six-Pack, the Euro-Plus Pact, and 
the Fiscal Compact Treaty, should be understood in this 
context.118 More problematic in light of the urgently needed 
financial assistance to Greece and other euro area Member 
States, however, was the set of provisions immediately preceding 
article 126 TFEU. The ostensibly strict prohibition of bailouts 
was particularly troublesome. As Smits has put it, article 125 
TFEU warns financial markets that “each Member State is ‘on its 
own’ and not backed by implicit guarantees from the [Union] 
or from fellow Member States.”119 Together with articles 123 and 
124 TFEU, the ‘no-bailout’ clause was intended to ensure that 
market forces exercise pressure on the borrowing activities of 
Member States, necessitating budgetary discipline.120 As it 
turned out, however, the markets proved unreliable to fulfill 
their task as the final arbiters of euro area Member States’ 
financial health.121 
There was no Union instrument in place for financial 
assistance to euro area Member States when the crisis hit.122 The 
1989 Delors Report had in fact suggested the possibility of 
financial support based on conditionality, but the drafters of the 
Maastricht Treaty did not follow up.123 However, it was clear 
from the start of the crisis that the Member States were willing to 
take coordinated action “to safeguard financial stability in the 
                                                                                                                                     
118. For a discussion, see Dariusz Adamski, National Power Games and Structural 
Failures in the European Macroeconomic Governance, 49 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1319 
(2012). 
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120. Id.; Pipkorn, supra note 45, at 275. 
121. Louis, supra note 41, at 979. 
122. Article 143(2) TFEU, supra note 2, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 111, enables the 
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euro area.”124 Confronted with limited resources under the EU 
budget, the Union and the Member States subsequently resorted 
to measures, which were “not wholly conventional.”125 The 
financial assistance mechanisms they devised—successively, the 
Greek Loan Facility, the EFSM, the EFSF, and the ESM—all 
appeared to run counter to the above-described rationale 
behind the ‘no-bailout’ clause. Yet, European Council President 
Van Rompuy was tasked to investigate the possibilities of a 
limited Treaty change “not modifying Article 125 TFEU” to 
facilitate the establishment of the ESM.126 Commentators were 
generally vexed the most, however, by the fact that the Member 
States created the Greek Loan Facility, the EFSF, and the ESM 
outside the framework of the Union Treaties. This gave the 
impression they were circumventing fundamental provisions of 
EU law through legal trickery. The Member States again took 
the ‘intergovernmental route’ with the aforementioned Fiscal 
Compact Treaty, which followed in early 2012. This led to 
heightened criticism of their piecemeal approach to addressing 
the roots of the debt crisis and the legal form their solutions 
took.127 
The Court’s judgment in Pringle is unlikely to mitigate such 
sentiments. To the contrary, detractors will no doubt see the 
judgment as further evidence of the erosion of the rule of law at 
the European level. Yet, given the severity of the sovereign debt 
crisis and the obvious political consensus among European 
leaders as to the necessity of a permanent stability mechanism, 
was it realistic to expect that the Court would strike down the 
ESM Treaty? After all, at stake was the stability of the euro area 
as a whole. This does not mean that the euro area Member 
States can circumvent key EMU-related provisions, such as 
                                                                                                                                     
124. See Statement by the Heads of State or Government of the Euro Area, March 
25, 2010. 
125. View of Advocate General Kokott, Thomas Pringle v. Gov’t of Ireland, Case 
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article 125(1) TFEU, by switching from the EU legal order to 
legal regimes set up under public international law. Some 
Member States did in fact argue that the ESM, as an 
independent international organization, falls outside the 
personal scope of application of article 125(1) TFEU.128 While 
the Court did not address this particular argument, it appears to 
follow the view of AG Kokott. She stressed that Member States 
are required to comply with their obligations under EU law 
when giving effect to commitments assumed under international 
agreements. Accordingly, the euro area Member States are 
bound by the requirements of article 125 TFEU also when they 
act as ESM Members.129 Citing the same case law, the Court 
affirmed that the euro area Member States may not disregard 
their duty to comply with EU law when exercising their 
competences to establish a permanent stability mechanism 
outside the framework of the Union Treaties.130 In that regard, 
the Court emphasized that article 136(3) TFEU ensures the 
ESM will operate in a way that will comply with EU law.131 
B. The Integrity of the EMU and the Use of International Agreements 
The European Council has stated that the “next steps in the 
process of completing EMU [are] based on deeper integration 
and reinforced solidarity for the euro area Member States.”132 
The establishment of the ESM was a serious first step towards the 
institutionalization of solidarity amongst euro area Member 
States after initial temporary financial assistance mechanisms 
paved the way. In Pringle, the Court squared the euro area 
Member States’ willingness and ability to provide stability 
support with the rationale behind the ‘no-bailout’ clause. 
Needless to say, this is a positive development. Further steps 
currently under discussion in Brussels include the direct 
recapitalization of banks by the ESM, a Single Resolution 
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Mechanism, and a European Redemption Fund.133 Just like 
solidarity, deeper integration comes at a cost. With the Six-Pack, 
the Fiscal Compact Treaty, and now the Two-Pack,134 Member 
States’ room to maneuver in the area of economic policy—in 
particular when it comes to budgetary policy—is gradually scaled 
back in an effort to minimize negative spillovers. Here, too, far-
reaching measures are currently under discussion. For example, 
the Commission recently announced it will propose a framework 
for ex ante coordination of major economic policy reforms in the 
context of the European Semester, as envisaged by the Fiscal 
Compact Treaty.135 
Over the past three years, the EMU has been overhauled. It 
is now common for policy-makers in Brussels to openly speak of 
completing a “genuine Economic and Monetary Union.” Given 
this development, it is striking that the Court adheres to a 
minimalist view of the EMU that is increasingly becoming 
outdated. As this Article illustrates, the Court drew a hard line 
between monetary policy and economic policy in Pringle. It 
separated the Monetary Union from the Economic Union with 
surgical precision, acknowledging the exclusive competence of 
the Union in the former and affording the euro area Member 
States substantial freedom in the latter. Although it is fairly 
obvious that the Court’s choice to allow for the ESM to be 
established outside the Union framework was dictated by the 
exceptional circumstances detailed above, one could reflect on 
the consequences for the integrity of the EMU and the 
constitutional character of the Union Treaties. 
As was already argued in the Delors Report, the Monetary 
Union and the Economic Union “form two integral parts of a 
single whole.”136 Notwithstanding the insufficient availability of 
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resources under the Union’s budget, the establishment of a 
permanent stability mechanism within the framework of the 
Union Treaties arguably would have better preserved the 
integrity of the EMU than the arrangements currently in place. 
Indeed, both the ECB and the European Parliament voiced 
their preference for the ESM to be established as a Union 
instrument rather than an intergovernmental mechanism.137 
The Commission, at one point, also seemed to be of the opinion 
that a permanent stability mechanism could be established on 
the basis of the Union Treaties,138 though it did not defend this 
position in Pringle for obvious reasons. However, the 
Commission recently stressed that the deepening of the EMU 
should be done within the Union Treaties and 
‘intergovernmental solutions’ should only be considered on an 
exceptional and transitional basis. It furthermore submitted that 
the ESM could eventually be integrated into the EU Treaty 
framework.139 But was there truly no possibility of establishing 
the ESM as a Union instrument? The daunting prospect of 
having to reach political agreement on an adjustment of the 
Union’s budget—which would require the consent of all 
Member States—likely had greater influence on the choice to 
establish the ESM as an international organization than any 
legal objections. 
The Union Treaties contain at least two provisions that 
could have been considered as a legal basis for the 
establishment of the ESM as a Union instrument in combination 
with the provisions on enhanced cooperation.140 However, in 
Pringle, the Court explicitly ruled out one option, article 122(2) 
TFEU. As was noted above, the Court considered that this 
provision “does not constitute an appropriate legal basis for the 
establishment of a stability mechanism of the kind envisaged by 
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[Decision 2011/199],” the objective of which is to “safeguard 
the stability of the euro area as a whole.”141 From this rather 
terse assessment we may gather that the Court finds the 
permanent nature of the ESM to be incompatible with the 
requirement in article 122(2) TFEU that financial assistance be 
granted to a Member State in difficulties caused by exceptional 
occurrences beyond its control. 
Following this line of reasoning, the exceptional nature of 
such occurrences allows only for temporary financial assistance. 
However, stability support provided by the ESM is by definition 
temporary, as the ESM can only grant support if indispensable 
to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole 
and of its Member States.142 Support should consequently cease 
once financial stability of the recipient Member State (and the 
euro area as a whole) has been secured. Therefore, stability 
support provided by the ESM could just as easily be considered 
compatible with article 122(2) TFEU in this respect. The 
permanent nature of the mechanism that is used to provide 
stability support does not change that. 
One could further argue that the objective of safeguarding 
the stability of the euro area as a whole, too, is compatible with 
article 122(2) TFEU. The provision refers to a Member State—
singular—in difficulties or threatened with severe difficulties. 
That should not necessarily lead to the conclusion that a 
financial assistance mechanism cannot be established as a Union 
instrument, though. After all, article 122(2) TFEU previously 
served as the legal basis for the EFSM Regulation, which had an 
even broader objective; namely, to preserve the financial stability 
of the Union.143 It is worthy to note that the objective of the ESM 
is not, as the Heads of State or Government have claimed and 
the Court suggested,144 solely safeguarding the stability of the 
euro area as a whole. The purpose of the ESM is to provide 
stability support to the benefit of its Members if indispensable to 
safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and 
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of its Member States.145 As the former objective can only be 
achieved—at least within the limits of the ESM Treaty—by 
contributing to the financial stability of individual Member 
States, excluding article 122(2) TFEU as a possible legal basis for 
a permanent stability mechanism seems overly formalistic. 
Had it been decided to establish the ESM as a Union 
instrument, the flexibility clause of article 352 TFEU would have 
been an alternative option. In Pringle, the Court did not rule out 
the possibility of establishing a permanent stability mechanism 
on the basis of article 352 TFEU. It merely stated that the 
availability of this provision as a possible legal basis does not 
impose on the Union any obligation to act.146 The substantive 
requirements article 352(1) TFEU places on the adoption of 
appropriate measures by the Council, where the Union Treaties 
have not provided the necessary powers to attain one of the 
objectives set out therein, appear to have been fulfilled. With 
reference to article 3(4) TEU, it could be argued that the 
establishment of a permanent stability mechanism by the Union 
would be necessary to preserve the stability of the euro area as a 
whole. As the Court indicated in Pringle, maintaining the 
financial stability of the Monetary Union can be identified as an 
inherent objective of the Union Treaties.147 
Can the Member States still have recourse to international 
agreements when the Union Treaties also provide for the 
possibility of the Union to take the same or similar action? The 
Court’s Bangladesh case law, on which the Pringle judgment 
builds,148 would suggest they can. Bangladesh concerned an act 
adopted by the representatives of the Member States meeting 
within the Council (i.e., an executive agreement under 
international law), that was challenged by the European 
Parliament. The Court ruled that the Member States are not 
precluded from exercising their competence collectively in areas 
in which the Union does not have exclusive competence.149 The 
Court’s Bangladesh doctrine is premised on an international law 
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approach to the issue of Member States concluding parallel 
agreements between themselves outside the framework of the 
Union Treaties and can indeed be defended from that 
perspective. However, the use of parallel agreements in cases 
where the Union could also have acted has been viewed with 
some suspicion. It has been argued that the Member States, by 
abandoning the framework of the Union Treaties, evade the 
constitutional principles and guarantees enshrined therein.150 
This latter approach, as opposed to the international law 
approach, acknowledges the constitutional value of the Union 
Treaties. Opting for the ‘intergovernmental route’ necessarily 
has consequences for democratic and judicial control in the 
Union. Even if the Member States do allocate tasks to the 
Union’s institutions within the framework of the newly created 
legal regime, they set the parameters within which the selected 
institutions operate—not the Union Treaties. As such, the 
conclusion of parallel agreements by the Member States could 
even be considered at odds with the principle of sincere 
cooperation.151 
If one accepts that the ESM or a similar stability mechanism 
could have been established on the basis of the Union Treaties 
and that parallel agreements concluded between the Member 
States go against the very idea of the Union Treaties having 
constitutional value, the next question should be why EU law 
should nonetheless allow the euro area Member States to 
conclude partial agreements. In principle, partial agreements 
(i.e., international agreements between smaller groups of 
Member States outside the framework of the Union Treaties)152 
are acceptable under certain circumstances. As long as they do 
not disregard their duty to comply with EU law, Member States 
should be able to conclude, for example, bilateral tax treaties or 
                                                                                                                                     
150. Bruno de Witte, Chameleonic Member States: Differentiation by Means of Partial 
and Parallel International Agreements, in THE MANY FACES OF DIFFERENTIATION IN EU 
LAW 231, 265 (Bruno de Witte et al. eds., 2001). 
151. TEU, supra note 2, art. 4(3), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 18. In Pringle, however, the 
Court concluded that article 4(3) TEU does not preclude the euro area Member States 
from concluding and ratifying the ESM Treaty, as the establishment of the ESM does 
not infringe the provisions of the TFEU. See Pringle, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 151–52 
(delivered Nov. 27, 2012). 
152. The typology used here is derived from de Witte, supra note 150. 
144 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:111 
seek further integration under the ‘Benelux clause.’153 Partial 
agreements by a substantial group of Member States, however, 
are not necessarily less detrimental to the integrity of the EU 
legal order than parallel agreements. The drafters of the 
Amsterdam Treaty seemed to have realized this when they 
introduced the enhanced cooperation procedure and decided 
to incorporate the Schengen acquis into the framework of the 
Union Treaties.154 One could argue that the decision of all euro 
area Member States to establish the ESM outside the framework 
of the Union Treaties has exactly the same consequences for 
democratic and judicial control, insofar as the EMU is 
concerned, as a parallel agreement would have Union-wide. 
As discussed above, the ESM makes use of the Union’s 
institutions.155 Yet, democratic and judicial control over the ESM 
is limited by the euro area Member States’ decision to step 
outside the framework of the Union Treaties. For example, the 
Commission cannot challenge acts adopted by the Board of 
Governors before the Court on the basis of article 263 TFEU, as 
the Council is formally not involved. While the Commission 
could start infringement proceedings under article 258 TFEU, 
that step is not lightly taken—especially against all seventeen 
euro area Member States. As meetings of the Board of 
Governors take place in the margin of Eurogroup meetings, 
which are informal by definition,156 this significant and 
controversial new area of EMU decision-making is essentially 
detached from the Union’s institutional framework. Meanwhile, 
the European Parliament was shut out from the process of 
establishing the ESM altogether.157 What is more, neither the 
Board of Governors nor the Troika can be held accountable to 
the European Parliament. Had a permanent stability mechanism 
been established as a Union instrument, on the basis of either 
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article 122(2) or 352 TFEU, its involvement would at least have 
been guaranteed. 
One could speculate what the Court would have made of 
the ESM Treaty had it been concluded under different 
circumstances. For example, in the event that the euro area 
Member States had deemed the establishment of the 
mechanism an important precautionary measure in times of 
economic stability. Imagine for a moment that the Commission 
had started infringement proceedings against these Member 
States, unlikely as that may seem. Facing similar legal questions, 
would the Court have come to the same conclusions as it did in 
Pringle or would it have sent the Member States back to the 
drawing board? More than likely, Court watchers and Brussels 
insiders would not have been as sure about the outcome of the 
case as they were in November 2012. 
CONCLUSION 
In Pringle, the Court had to choose between putting the 
stability of the euro area at risk—which arguably would have 
been the result of strictly applying article 125 TFEU—and 
reducing article 136(3) TFEU to an essentially superfluous 
provision before it even entered the Treaty. Given the 
circumstances, sacrificing article 136(3) TFEU was the only 
reasonable option. Although the European Council initially 
presented the first amendment of the Union Treaties since the 
troubled ratification of the Lisbon Treaty as an instrumental 
step in setting up the ESM, few will contest its current view that 
the new provision is not that important after all. Meanwhile, the 
‘no-bailout’ clause remains a key provision underpinning the 
EMU; the ESM Treaty represents a serious first step towards the 
institutionalization of solidarity within the euro area, but it has 
not transformed the EMU into a transfer union. Importantly, 
the Court’s inventive interpretation of the ‘no-bailout’ clause 
leaves its original purpose intact. Financial assistance by means 
of the ESM was explicitly made compatible with article 125 
TFEU only if subject to strict conditionality. This temporarily 
relieves recipient Member States from the disciplinary forces of 
the market, but it nonetheless prompts them to implement 
sound budgetary policies. Ultimately, that was what the ‘no-
bailout’ clause was supposed to ensure. 
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The severity of the sovereign debt crisis has led to a broad 
political consensus on the necessity of a permanent stability 
mechanism in Europe, if not always on the size of the financial 
assistance or the appropriateness of the drastic austerity 
measures demanded from recipient Member States. Squaring 
the euro area Member States’ willingness and ability to provide 
stability support with the rationale behind the ‘no-bailout’ 
clause was no easy task. The Court should be applauded for 
achieving this. Yet, at the same time, the Pringle judgment also 
leaves the euro area Member States considerable freedom to 
give their response to the sovereign debt crisis shape outside the 
confines of the Union Treaties. While that is certainly 
defendable and backed up by the Court with sound legal 
reasoning, it has consequences for democratic and judicial 
control in the Union. 
 
